By the time Emilee Mullendore’s case reached the Oklahoma Supreme Court, she had already lost at every level. An administrative law judge denied her workers’ compensation claim. The Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed that denial. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals agreed. For many injured workers, that would have ended the fight.
John R. Colbert did not let it end there.
Representing Mullendore on appeal, Colbert helped persuade the Oklahoma Supreme Court to reverse every decision below. The resulting opinion, Mullendore v. Mercy Hospital Ardmore, 2019 OK 11, 438 P.3d 358, became an important precedent concerning unexplained workplace injuries, speculative pre-existing conditions, and appellate review under Oklahoma’s Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act. The published opinion shows the determination of Colbert in pursuing justice for his client.
Mullendore was a 21-year-old certified nursing assistant at Mercy Hospital Ardmore. During her shift, she prepared eight bags of ice for patients. As she stepped through the nutrition-room doorway, her right foot moved one way while her leg and knee turned the other. She fell and could not walk.
The medical evidence confirmed a real injury. Mullendore experienced immediate pain and swelling, and an MRI revealed a tear in the cartilage of her knee. She had never injured that knee, complained about it, or sought treatment for it before the accident.
Mercy nevertheless argued that her fall was “idiopathic”—caused by a condition personal to Mullendore rather than her employment. Its medical expert attributed the injury to an allegedly pre-existing patellofemoral malalignment. The problem, as Colbert’s appellate position emphasized and the Supreme Court ultimately recognized, was that the objective medical evidence did not substantiate that diagnosis. Neither the X-ray nor the MRI identified malalignment, dysplasia, dislocation, or another pre-existing abnormality.
The appellate advocacy was effective because it attacked both the legal premise and the factual foundation of the denial.
First, the argument focused the Court on the actual language of the statute. Oklahoma law defined an accident to include an event that was unintended, unexpected, occurred at an identifiable time and place, and happened by chance or “from unknown causes.” The employer could not simply attach the label “idiopathic” to an unexplained event and treat that label as proof that the injury was unrelated to work. In fact, the Court observed that an event attributed to an unknown cause could fit the statute’s definition of an accident.
Second, the advocacy methodically tested the employer’s medical theory against the record. The Supreme Court identified nine separate facts supporting Mullendore, including her complete lack of prior knee problems, the immediate onset of pain and swelling, the documented cartilage tear, and the absence of any diagnosed pre-existing condition on her imaging studies. The Court concluded that the Commission’s decision lacked substantial evidentiary support and that the employer’s contrary theory “lacks credibility.”
That is a significant appellate accomplishment. Colbert was not asking the Supreme Court merely to choose between two equally supported medical opinions. He demonstrated that the opinion accepted below rested on a condition the objective records did not show. By tying the medical evidence to the statutory language and the proper standard of review, Mullendore’s appellate presentation gave the Court a principled path to reversal.
The Court took that path. It vacated the Court of Civil Appeals’ opinion, reversed the Workers’ Compensation Commission, reversed the administrative law judge, and held that Mullendore sustained a compensable injury. The case was remanded for further proceedings in accordance with that ruling.
The sharp dissent underscores how difficult the victory was. Three justices would have upheld the denial, while another concurred only in part. Overcoming the decisions of an administrative judge, the Commission, and an appellate court—on a disputed record and under a deferential standard of review—required far more than identifying an ordinary error. It required showing that the case had been decided on a legally unsound and factually unsupported theory.
Mullendore has proven to be more than a victory for one client. The Oklahoma State Courts Network’s Citationizer currently identifies eight published Oklahoma appellate decisions citing the case: five Court of Civil Appeals opinions and three Oklahoma Supreme Court opinions. Four classify their treatment as “Discussed at Length.” Later courts have relied on Mullendore for the substantial-evidence standard, the law governing compensable injuries, the importance of objective medical findings, and the rule that the law in effect on the injury date controls. Those citing decisions include the Supreme Court’s opinions in Farley v. City of Claremore, Johnson v. Midwest City-Del City Public Schools, and Stricklen v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund.
For John Colbert, Mullendore demonstrates the essence of effective appellate advocacy: refusing to accept an unsupported result, mastering a complicated record, finding the decisive language in the statute, and presenting the Supreme Court with a compelling reason to correct an injustice. His work did not simply revive Emilee Mullendore’s claim. It produced a precedent that Oklahoma courts continue to use when deciding the rights of other injured workers.
